Sad, thus true: negativity bias in judgments of truth by Hilbig, Benjamin E.
www.ssoar.info
Sad, thus true: negativity bias in judgments of truth
Hilbig, Benjamin E.
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Hilbig, B. E. (2009). Sad, thus true: negativity bias in judgments of truth. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
45(4), 983-986. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.012
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-292118
Accepted Manuscript
Sad, thus true. Negativity bias in judgments of truth
Benjamin E. Hilbig
PII: S0022-1031(09)00093-6
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.012
Reference: YJESP 2250
To appear in: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Received Date: 24 October 2008
Revised Date: 30 March 2009
Accepted Date: 4 April 2009
Please cite this article as: Hilbig, B.E., Sad, thus true. Negativity bias in judgments of truth, Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology (2009), doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.012
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers
we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and
review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Running head: Sad, thus true  1 
 
 
 
 
Sad, thus true. Negativity bias in judgments of truth. 
 
 
 
Benjamin E. Hilbig 
University of Mannheim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To be considered as FlashReport 
Word count (text and notes): 2256 
 
Second Revision  
 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Running head: Sad, thus true  2 
ABSTRACT 
 An effect observable across many different domains is that negative instances tend to 
be more influential than comparably positive ones. This phenomenon has been termed the 
negativity bias. In the current work, it was investigated whether this effect pertains to 
judgments of truth. That is, it was hypothesized that information valence and perceived 
validity should be associated such that more negative information is deemed more true. This 
claim was derived from the findings that negative instances tend to demand more attentional 
resources and that more elaborate processing can render messages more persuasive. In three 
experiments manipulating information valence through framing– and assessing judgments of 
truth – the hypothesized negativity bias was corroborated. Theoretical explanations and 
implications for further research are discussed.  
 
Word count: 120 
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INTRODUCTION 
Across various disciplines within scientific psychology and beyond, one commonly 
accepted and well documented phenomenon is what has been called the negativity bias. This 
term refers to the general tendency for negative information, events, or stimuli to have a 
greater impact on human cognition, affect, and behavior than comparably positive instances. 
In broad reviews of the extant literature Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs 
(2001) as well as Rozin and Royzman (2001) come to the conclusion that ‘bad is stronger 
than good’ across a wide range of domains such as impression formation, perception, 
memory, decision making, and many others. However, I am aware of no study investigating 
whether negative information is – per se – deemed more valid or true. It is therefore the aim 
of the current article to explore whether the perceived veracity of information is impacted by 
its valence. Stated bluntly, it was tested whether instances may not (only) be ‘sad, but true’ – 
as the every-day aphorism implies – but possibly ‘sad, thus true’. 
Why should we be more inclined to accept negative information as more accurate? 
Even though it is beyond the scope of this report to test specific mechanisms responsible for 
the hypothesized valence-validity association, it seems appropriate to point out from which 
theoretical positions it was derived. First, it has been argued that negative instances are often 
more informative (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990) – parallel to the higher informativeness of 
disconfirming evidence (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992). So, there could be a simple direct 
association between valence and (perceived) veracity.  
Secondly, there is evidence for increased elaboration of negative instances which has 
been termed ‘informational negativity effect’ (e.g. Lewicka, 1997; see also Lewicka, 
Czapinski, & Peeters, 1992). Specifically, different lines of research indicate that negative 
stimuli are detected more reliably (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003), lead to more elaborate 
attributions (Bohner, Bless, Schwarz, & Strack, 1988), and generally demand more attention, 
thus entailing more elaborate processing (Baumeister et al., 2001). Rozin and Royzman 
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(2001) refer to these findings as negative differentiation, stating that ‘our cognition is perhaps 
more complex, elaborated, and fine-tuned’ (p. 299), comparing negative instances to positive 
ones. 
Finally, there is a noteworthy body of literature which confirms that more elaboration, 
deeper processing, and high processing motivation can increase the persuasiveness of 
messages (e.g. Petty & Briñol, 2008; Shiv, Britton, Payne, Mick, & Monroe, 2004). Similarly, 
though investigating the realm of wishful thinking rather than negativity bias, Bar-Hillel, 
Budescu, and Amar (2008) showed that the causal link ‘I focus on, therefore I believe in’ (p. 
283) is well-supported. Also, elaboration can increase the perceived truth of past-events, even 
and especially when these never happened, which has been explained as an effect of 
constructive processing (Kealy, Kuiper, & Klein, 2006). 
So, since negative information is often especially diagnostic we may have learned to 
pay increased attention to it. Consequently, it is more likely to demand thorough processing 
than positive information. Finally, given that more elaboration can yield more persuasion, 
information valence will impact truth judgments. However, before testing the proposed 
process it is clearly necessary to show that the to-be-explained effect actually exists. That is, I 
first aimed to demonstrate that more negative instances are indeed deemed more veridical.   
This conjecture was tested in three experiments which investigated participants’ 
judgments of truth concerning different pieces of statistical information, taken from the 
German Police Crime Statistics 2007 (Federal Criminal Police Office, n.d.) and the Statistical 
Yearbook 2008 (Federal Statistical Office, n.d.). Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted as 
online-surveys adhering closely to the standards for internet experiments suggested by Reips 
(2002). Experiment 3 was administered via ordinary questionnaires.  
Importantly, to test the hypothesized valence-validity association, information shown 
to participants would need to differ in valence but not in objective accuracy. That is, the 
actual accuracy of the information provided must be held constant across experimental 
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conditions. A typical method for equating information while manipulating its valence is 
framing (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). That is, formally equivalent messages are framed as 
gains vs. losses or, more generally, positively vs. negatively. This principle was used in the 
experiments reported herein. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The first experiment was conducted as an online-survey. After providing consent and 
demographical information, participants were shown statistical information from the crime 
domain and instructed to provide a truth rating. As information, the success rate1 of crimes 
from the category of rape and aggravated sexual coercion (denoted ‘rape’ in what follows) 
was presented. The actual success rate (85%) was used. Half of the participants were told that 
85% of attempted instances of rape were successful (negative frame), while the other half 
were told that 15% were unsuccessful (positive frame). All participants were then asked to 
judge the truth of the stated information on a 4-point scale. 110 participants (84 female, aged 
M = 25, SD = 7) were recruited via a mailing list and randomly assigned to one of these 
conditions. 
Additionally, since effects of dispositional optimism or pessimism may play a role, 
individual scores of optimism and pessimism were assessed by means of a German version 
(Glaesmer, Hoyer, Klotsche, & Herzberg, 2008) of the revised Life-Orientation-Test (Scheier, 
Carver, & Bridges, 1994), filled out by participants before the judgment task. 
Results and discussion 
Participants rated the information to be true with M = 2.9 (SE = .09) in the negative vs. 
M = 2.5 (SE = .11) in the positive framing condition, t(104.5) = 2.9, p = .004, Cohen’s d = .60, 
resembling a medium to large effect size (Cohen, 1988). The results are displayed in Figure 1. 
Controlling for optimism and pessimism in a one-way ANCOVA revealed that both 
covariates had significant effects, but the effect of framing condition remained significant and 
actually increased very slightly (from p² = .075 to  p² = .076). In sum, the hypothesized 
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negativity bias was corroborated using formally equivalent information and manipulating its 
frame. However, the success rate of a crime is a concept not easily understood (higher success 
rates being more negative) and so the results may be distorted by participants 
misunderstanding the task. Therefore, the experiment was repeated using the clearance rate2 
as information, instead. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Following the logic of Experiment 1, the information frame was again manipulated. 38 
participants (30 female, aged M = 17.3, SD = .50, recruited from a high school course of 
introductory psychology) were randomly assigned to two groups. These were shown the 
actual clearance rate of rape (70%), either framed positively (70% of cases cleared) or 
negatively (30% of cases not cleared) and asked to judge, again on a 4-point scale, the truth of 
the provided statement. Also, like in Experiment 1, individual differences in optimism and 
pessimism were assessed (before the judgment task).  
Results and discussion 
As can again be seen in Figure 1, participants’ truth ratings were higher in the negative 
(M = 3.1, SE = .15) as compared to the positive framing condition (M = 2.6, SE = .15), which 
was significant with t(36) = 2.6, p
 
= .015, d = .80, and entailed is large effect size. Neither 
optimism nor pessimism explained additional variance. So, the negativity bias in judgments of 
truth, as found in Experiment 1, could be replicated. However, there are two limitations 
pertaining to Experiments 1 and 2 which deserve additional attention: First, online studies 
principally allow participants to cheat, that is, to look up the truth of information presented. 
Although there is no immediate reason why this should have been more likely in the negative 
framing condition (thus leading to selectively higher truth ratings), a replication using simple 
questionnaires seemed desirable. Secondly, the negativity bias found may be specific to the 
crime domain. Thus, I aimed to replicate the reported effects in a different domain. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
The principal logic of this experiment was again to manipulate the frame of the 
information presented (between participants) while holding the information itself constant. In 
contrast to the previous experiments, the information was not from the crime domain but from 
demographics. Specifically, participants were shown the probability of a marriage to be 
divorced within the first ten years which is, in Germany, about 20% (Federal Statistical 
Office, n.d.). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: In the positive 
frame, they were informed that 80% of marriages lasted 10 years or longer whereas their 
counterparts in the negative frame were informed that 20% of marriages were divorced within 
the first 10 years. Like in the previous experiments, participants rated the truth of this 
statement on a 4-point scale. The experiment was run using simple 1-page questionnaires 
dispersed to a community sample of 33 participants (16 female, aged M = 27.7, SD = 12.6).   
Results and discussion 
Participants in the negative framing condition again provided higher truth ratings (M = 
2.7, SE = .18) than their counterparts in the positive framing condition (M = 2.1, SE = .20), 
which was significant, t(31) = 2.3, p
 
= .026, again entailing a large effect size of d = .82. Once 
more, this result is depicted in Figure 1. So, the predicted negativity bias could be replicated 
in a different judgment domain and using simple questionnaires rather than an online 
experiment. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The aim of the experiments reported herein was to investigate whether the negativity 
bias – which can be found in many areas of human cognition (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin 
& Royzman, 2001) – pertains to judgments of truth. That is, I sought to show that information 
will, by itself, be deemed more valid whenever it is more negative.  
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In three experiments, participants’ judgments of truth concerning different statistical 
statements were assessed. It could be shown that framing the provided information in a 
negative vs. positive way clearly affected these judgments of truth, although the information 
was actually the same in all conditions: Whenever the success rate (Exp. 1) or clearance rate 
(Exp. 2) of a crime were negatively framed, the information was deemed more true, as 
compared to the positive frame. Likewise, the stated divorce rate (Exp. 3) was judged to be 
more true when framed negatively (proportion of marriages divorced within 10 years) rather 
than positively (proportion of marriages lasting 10 years or longer). The obtained negativity 
bias entailed medium to large effect sizes, reaching statistical significance even in small 
samples (Experiments 2 and 3). Also, it was robust across different judgment domains, using 
different assessment methods, and different samples of participants. Finally, the effect was not 
altered when individual differences in optimism and pessimism were controlled for. 
However, the negativity bias demonstrated herein calls for an explanation. That is, the 
psychological mechanisms underlying the reported effects are by no means clear. As outlined 
in the Introduction, I have reasoned that the greater diagnosticity of negative information 
(Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) may be responsible for such an effect. 
Moreover, negative information can lead to more thorough processing (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & 
Cacioppo, 1998), which may then produce the negativity bias since more elaboration can 
increase the persuasiveness of messages (Tormala, Brinol, & Petty, 2007). 
Interestingly, others have proposed similar processes in other contexts. For example, 
Igou and Bless (2007) recently argued that biasing effects of framing are due to increased 
necessity for elaboration in ambiguous situations. This claim follows from the ideas of the 
affect infusion model (e.g. Forgas, 2007; Forgas & George, 2001) according to which 
environmental aspects (such as frame or mood) are more likely to impact behavior when a 
person must go beyond the information provided to complete a task. As judging the statistical 
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statements presented to the participants in the current experiments is likely to represent such a 
situation, it seems plausible for information valence to affect its perceived veracity. 
Also, it should be pointed out that the underlying direct association between valence 
and informativeness is likely to be reinforced by different social processes. For example, we 
might have learned to trust negative information more, simply because others are much more 
unlikely to lie to us when bringing us bad news, whereas they may well exaggerate when 
informing us about something good. Similarly, one might propose that negative messages are 
more likely to be conveyed by sources we tend to trust, especially the media (given the strong 
focus on negative events in the news, e.g. Grabe & Kamhawi, 2006; Grabe, Lang, & Zhao, 
2003), which would foster a learned negative association between valence and subjective 
validity. 
Clearly, much further research is needed to test how the negativity bias in judgments 
of truth comes about. To investigate whether it really is produced by more elaboration, as 
hypothesized herein, analyses of decision times or experimental manipulations of the 
opportunity for enhanced elaboration, are needed. In sum, the current work will hopefully 
provide a compelling demonstration of the negativity bias in judgments of truth. Of course, 
the challenge does not end here. On the contrary: If events we encounter are not merely ‘sad, 
but true’, but actually ‘sad, thus true’, it seems central to uncover the mechanisms responsible 
such effects – although this is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, I hope to have 
pointed out at least one line of arguments which could inspire future tests of why we see more 
truth in the negative. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 
‘success rate’ denotes the proportion of successful attempts to a crime. So, in the 
current case, this ratio refers to instances in which the victim was actually raped. 
 
2
 ‘clearance rate’ denotes the proportion of registered cases of a crime which were 
cleared by the police or associated forces. That is, a high clearance rate indicates that culprits 
were caught in most instances. 
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FIGURE CAPTION 
 
Figure 1. Mean truth ratings (original scale ranging from 1 to 4) for the negative vs. positive 
framing conditions in each of the experiments. Error bars represent one standard error of the 
mean. 
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